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1 Institute of Neuroscience and Psychology, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK, 2Department of Psychology, University of
Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK
For addressees to respond in a timely fashion, they cannot simply process the speaker’s
utterance as it occurs and wait till it finishes. Instead, they predict both when the
speaker will conclude and what linguistic forms will be used. While doing this, they must
also prepare their own response. To explain this, we draw on the account proposed
by Pickering and Garrod (2013a), in which addressees covertly imitate the speaker’s
utterance and use this to determine the intention that underlies their upcoming utterance.
They use this intention to predict when and how the utterance will end, and also to
drive their own production mechanisms for preparing their response. Following Arnal and
Giraud (2012), we distinguish between mechanisms that predict timing and content. In
particular, we propose that the timing mechanism relies on entrainment of low-frequency
oscillations between speech envelope and brain. This constrains the context that feeds
into the determination of the speaker’s intention and hence the timing and form of the
upcoming utterance. This approach typically leads to well-timed contributions, but also
provides a mechanism for resolving conflicts, for example when there is unintended
speaker overlap.
Keywords: dialog, turn-taking, prediction, timing, content
Introduction
How is it possible for most conversations to be so fluent and efficient? Interlocutors tend to respond
coherently and appropriately to each other. But in addition, they do so in good time—they do not
leave long gaps between contributions, nor do they speak simultaneously for more than a brief
moment (Sacks et al., 1974). To understand this remarkable and almost universal ability for turn
transitions, we need to explain the cognitive processes that take place in people’s minds. So far,
psychologists have developed detailed accounts of the moment-by-moment processes that underlie
producing and comprehending in isolation, but have much less to say about the moment-by-
moment processes involved in conversation. In this paper, we propose an account of those processes
that specifically explains turn transitions.
The Nature of Turn Transitions
We begin with an example from Schegloff (1996, p. 73). Two students are talking on the phone
about a book purchase, with [ indicating overlapping speech, and numbers indicating noticeable
pauses in seconds)1,2.
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1.
Bee: I’nna tell you on:e course.
(0.5)
Ava: [( ).]
Bee: [(Themah- ] themah:dern art. The twunnieth century
a:rt
there’s about eight books,
Ava: Mm[hm,
Bee: [En I wen tuh buy a book the other day I [went ]
‘bh went=
Ava: [(mm)]
Bee: =down tuh N.Y.U. tuh get it becuz it’s the only place
thet
car[ries the book
Ava: [Mmm
Ava: Mmh
Bee: Tch! En it wz twun::ty do::lliz.
Ava: Oh my god.
(0.4)
Bee: Yeuh he-ez he wz handing me the book en ’etol’ me
twunny
dolliz I almos’ dro(h)pped i(h)[t ‘hh ‘hh
Ava: [thhunh.
Bee: ‘hhh I said but fer twunny dollars I bettuh hh ‘hh
yihknow,
(0.2)
Bee: ‘hhh h[hold o:nto i(h)hh] huhh huh] ‘hh!
Ava: [not drop it. ] huhh huh]
(0.2)
Bee: Ih wz, (0.2) y’know (fun).=...
It is quite clear that the interlocutors contribute sequentially.
On the one hand, any pauses are very short, but on the other,
there is little overlap. In most cases, the overlap is not likely
to interfere with comprehension, because people are able to
1Transcription conventions for the original examples in our paper are as follows:
(.) indicates brief pause; [ indicates overlap; : indicates lengthening; .hh indicates
long inhalation; (=) at the end of one line and the beginning of the next
indicate that the speech is continuous; ( ) indicates that the speech here was
unintelligible to the transcriber. Speech between >XXX< is more compressed in
pace, speech between <XXX> is more stretched out in pace. Upper case indicates
unusually loud speech. In some cases we have added bold font for illustrative
purposes.
2A more literal rendition of this exchange is:
Bee: I’m going to tell you about one course. Themodern art – the twentieth century
art – there’s about eight books.
Ava: mm
Bee: And I went to buy a book the other day –
Ava: mm
Bee: went down-town to NYU to get it because it’s the only place that carries the
book.
Ava: mm
Bee: And it was twenty dollars.
Ava: Oh my god.
Bee: Yeah he was handing me the book and he told me twenty dollars. I almost
dropped it -
Ava: huh
Bee: I said for twenty dollars I better you know-
Bee: hold onto it
Ava: Not drop it
Bee: I was - you know. . . .
speak and comprehend “backchannel” contributions such asmm
(or listen and produce such contributions) at the same time.
Somehow, the addressee must be able to know when to speak and
when to be quiet, even though she does not know exactly what
her partner is going to say.
Conversation analysts have very carefully analyzed
what people do during conversations such as these (i.e.,
rather than highly ritualized or formulaic interchanges).
Among other observations, Sacks et al. (1974, pp. 700–701)
noted:
(a) Overwhelmingly, one party talks at a time.
(b) Occurrences ofmore than one speaker at a time are common,
but brief.
(c) Transitions (from one turn to the next) with no gap
and no overlap are common. Together with transitions
characterized by slight gap or slight overlap, they make up
the vast majority of transitions.
(d) Turn size is not fixed, but varies.
(e) What parties say is not specified in advance.
(f) Turn-allocation techniques are obviously used. A current
speaker may select a next speaker (as when he addresses
a question to another party); or parties may self-select in
starting to talk.
(g) Repair mechanisms exist for dealing with turn-taking errors
and violations; e.g., if two parties find themselves talking
at the same time, one of them will stop prematurely, thus,
repairing the trouble.
All of these observations are clearly relevant for the above
example. Our goal is to explain such observations in cognitive-
psychological terms. Our focus is on (c), and to some extent
(b), (f), and (g). One important reason for (a) is presumably
basic limitations on processing resources (it is very hard to
produce and comprehend different messages at the same time).
Observations (d) and (e) occur because conversations are
generally unplanned and because people’s goals vary (they may
want to make small or large contributions) and may be affected
by the conversation itself.
Sacks et al.’s (1974) work is based on English. Stivers et al.
(2009) compared turn transitions for questions and responses
across speakers of 10 diverse languages and found slight variation
in distribution. But in all cases the most frequent interval
was between 0 and 200ms. In other words, conversationalists
show a strong disposition to avoid overlap and to minimize
silence between turns. They concluded that these properties
of conversation constitute robust human universals (though
cultural and linguistic factors lead to minor variations). So how is
it possible for interlocutors to contribute with such short intervals
between turns, while avoiding extensive overlap? How can the
addressee prepare and execute an appropriate response while
comprehending the speaker?
The Processes Underlying Turn Transition
Given such intervals, addressees cannot simply wait for the
speaker to end before preparing their response. First, it would of
course take some time to determine that the speaker has ended.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 June 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 751
Garrod and Pickering Predicting turn transitions
Second, many studies have demonstrated that producing a single
word requires about 175ms to access meaning, 75ms for syntax,
205ms for phonology, and 145ms for phonetic encoding and
articulation (Indefrey and Levelt, 2004; see Sahin et al., 2009,
for somewhat different estimates). Even if these timings might
be slightly different in conversation (rather than, for example,
picture naming), it is clear that, in general, addressees must be
able to estimate when the speaker’s turn will end and begin
response preparation several hundred milliseconds before that
point.
This suggests that comprehension and production processes
must be tightly interwoven. In fact, this assumption is quite
controversial within the psychology of language, which tends
to have studied comprehension and production in isolation
and assumes that they involve largely independent mechanisms
(Pickering and Garrod, 2013a). According to traditional
accounts, dialog therefore can be characterized as serial monolog,
in which the speaker produces and the addressee listens, and at
the turn-transition point (i.e., transition relevance place) they
switch roles and processes.
In fact, the serial monolog account suggests that speakers
cannot prepare their utterances until they realize that their
partner has completed (which may be later than the actual
completion point). This would obviously be incompatible
with Sacks et al. (1974) and Stivers et al. (2009). To avoid
these problems, comprehenders would have to use ancillary
mechanisms based on their comprehension systems to predict
turn completions. These mechanisms would not be relevant for
production, so they would have to begin preparing a response
using their production systems in parallel to comprehension-
based prediction. Moreover, they would have to determine the
meaning of the complete utterance and then use this as a basis
for generating an appropriate response.
These problems are, however, avoided if comprehenders use
their production systems to make predictions and prepare their
responses together. The mechanisms that they use to predict
a speaker’s final word, for example, are closely related to the
mechanisms they themselves use to produce their response—
or indeed to complete their partner’s utterance if necessary
(e.g., to help with word finding difficulty; A: That tree has,
uh, uh . . . B: tentworms; Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986, p. 6).
We now (1) specify the problem faced by the addressee; (2)
discuss how addressees use predictions of timing and content
to predict when the speaker will complete; and (3) discuss
how the addressee can produce an appropriate and timely
response.
Managing Fluent Turn-Transition Requires
Predicting Both Speech Content and
Timing
The addressee has to predict when the speaker is going to finish,
and prepare an appropriate response. It would not be sufficient
to prepare a response without predicting the end-point, because
studies have shown that producing a prepared linguistic response
to a cue takes several hundredmilliseconds. For example, Ferreira
(1991) had participants memorize and then produce sentences
following a cue, and found response times of 500ms or more.
It takes at least as long to initiate prepared picture naming
(e.g., Piai et al., 2011). Similarly, simply predicting the end-
point would merely remove any time needed to determine
that the speaker had ended, but not help with response
preparation.
In fact, De Ruiter et al. (2006) showed that listeners could
accurately estimate when a speaker’s conversational turn was
about to end. Their participants heard turns taken from
recordings of natural conversations and indicated precisely when
they thought the turn would end. The average response was about
186ms before the turn actually ended. Interestingly, turn-ending
estimates were not affected by flattening the pitch contour of the
speech, but were dramatically affected when the lexico/semantic
content was removed. This suggests that listeners used the
content to predict turn endings. It is of course possible that
other sources of prosodic information might affect estimates; for
example, future investigations could test whether addressees are
sensitive to rising intonation when responding to a question. In
a subsequent study, Magyari and De Ruiter (2012) had another
group of listeners predict the remaining words in De Ruiter
et al.’s turn fragments. They found turn-end judgments were
more precise when those listenersmade accurate predictions than
when they did not. An obvious explanation of these findings is
that people’s predictions of words constitute a factor (alongside
speech rate) that is used to predict turn endings.
Experimental studies have shown that people predict aspects
of upcoming words such as their syntactic features (e.g., Van
Berkum et al., 2005) and their sound (e.g., DeLong et al., 2005),
and that they also predict upcoming constituent structure (Staub
and Clifton, 2006). Indeed, many theoretical accounts assume
that comprehension is an inherently predictive process (Hale,
2001; Levy, 2008). We therefore propose that people can draw
on local predictions of words and other linguistic information to
predict turn endings.
It may also be possible to make predictions relating to
semantics and pragmatics over a much longer period. The
semantics of the context will place great constraints on the
upcoming content (e.g., whether the speaker is likely to talk
about food, work, holiday plans, or whatever). Of course, such
information can come from the current utterance (e.g., Changing
the subject, I’m hungry—what would you . . . ). Sometimes this
information will only be apparent just before the prediction is
needed, but often the relevant words occur early in the utterance,
or in a previous utterance. In other cases, the information
comes from the non-linguistic context (e.g., an unfolding event
such as a parade), or from shared background knowledge (i.e.,
common ground). Usually, this information is available well
before the prediction is needed. The addressee also benefits
from determining the speaker’s speech act before it is complete,
because whether the speaker is producing a statement, question,
or command may help determine the upcoming length of the
utterance. (As we discuss later, determining the speech act is also
critical to preparing a response).
From these sources of information, the addressee could
predict what the speaker is likely to say. These predictions could
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include determining how much the speaker has left to say, as
well as what the speaker is talking about. But to determine
when the speaker will finish, the addressee has to combine these
predictions with information about the speaker’s speech rate. As
our focus is on turn-transition, we now consider prediction of
remaining content (what the speaker has left to say) and precise
timing (when the speaker will finish). We then show how these
predictions feed into the content and timing of the response itself.
Using Prediction-by-Simulation in Turn
Transition
Now we account for addressees’ ability to predict turn-
ending and deliver an appropriate and timely response. To do
this, we draw on the integrated account of production and
comprehension developed by Pickering andGarrod (2013a). This
account is broadly compatible with other integrated accounts,
which typically relate to language learning or distribution as well
as language processing, such as the P-Chain framework (Dell and
Chang, 2014) and the Production-Distribution-Comprehension
account (MacDonald, 2013), as well as by evidence that
prediction during comprehension engages production processes
(Federmeier, 2007).
To predict the speaker’s utterance, we proposed that the
addressee attempts to determine the speaker’s intention and
uses that intention to predict what the speaker would say. For
our purposes, the two aspects of this account that we need to
consider are (1) that the addressee combines interpretation of
the context and covert imitation of the speaker’s prior utterance
to estimate the intention; and (2) that the addressee uses the
intention to predict the speaker’s completion in the same way
that the addressee would predict his or her own utterance if
speaking at that point (though adjusting for differences between
the speaker and the addressee). This process is known as
prediction-by-simulation and works because the comprehender
has similar representations and mechanisms to the producer.
(Comprehenders may also use prediction-by-association, which
relies on past experiences during comprehension; see Pickering
and Garrod, 2013b, for discussion).
Consider a situation in which a mother is cooking dinner and
her son comes into the kitchen and turns to speak. Based on the
context (the food, the time, knowledge of her son’s habits) but
without any utterance, she estimates that his intention is to ask
what is for dinner. But he then says What are we going to do
after . . . and she now combines the context and the utterance to
derive an (updated) intention—that he is producing a question
in which the only missing element is something referring to
dinner. Pickering and Garrod (2013a) assume that she represents
his intention and that this constitutes her own “production
command,” which sets off the processes that she would use to
complete the utterance herself (adjusting for differences between
herself and her son). This means that she converts the prior
utterance into a production representation via “covert imitation,”
which is then compatible with the format of the intention.
To understand how addressees predict speakers’ utterances,
we first note that Pickering and Garrod (2013a) argued that
speakers predict their own utterances, using so-called forward
models. For example, it may take several hundred milliseconds
to start naming an object (e.g., Piai et al., 2011), but well before
this, speakers can construct representations of what they believe
they will say and what they will experience themselves saying.
Psycholinguistic evidence for this claim comes from the finding
that speakers are affected by the contextual probability of a target
word or phrase given the preceding context. If the probability is
higher, the speakers are more likely to produce a reduced form
(Aylett and Turk, 2004) or to omit an optional word such as
the complementizer that (Jaeger, 2010). This suggests that the
speaker is sensitive to the probability of the target given the
context, before uttering the target, and therefore has predicted
the target by this point.
Pickering and Garrod (2013a) based their account on
the mechanisms of action control, in which people predict
movements before they occur and while they are occurring (and
use their predictions to make corrections on-line; e.g., Wolpert,
1997). It assumes that people learn the relationship between their
intentions and the outcomes (e.g., speech or arm movement),
so that the forward model can be computed independently
of the implementation of the action. It also assumes that
people represent the inverse model of this relationship between
outcomes and intentions on the basis of the forward model.
They can then use the paired forward-inverse models to
predict the outcomes of their actions (via forward models) and
subsequently modify those actions when necessary (via inverse
models), with both the learning and the on-line control being
driven by prediction error minimization. Theories of speech
production make such claims about syllables and phonemes
(Hickok et al., 2011; Tourville and Guenther, 2011). Pickering
and Garrod (2013a) make the more general claim that speakers
can concurrently predict at the full range of linguistic levels, such
as semantics, syntax, and phonology, and that they also make
predictions about timing.
Following this, Pickering and Garrod (2013a) argued that
comprehenders predict other people’s utterances, again using
forward-inverse model pairings. For example, if they believe that
their partner is about to name an object, they can construct
representations of what they believe their partner will say and
what they will experience their partner saying. This is compatible
with theories of action perception, in which people predict their
partner’s unfolding movements (Wolpert et al., 2003; Oztop
et al., 2005). To do this, Pickering and Garrod argued that
comprehenders covertly imitate the speaker, derive the (putative)
intention of the speaker (using a combination of context and
inverse model), use that intention to derive their upcoming
intention, and treat this upcoming intention as the input to the
forward models that predict the upcoming utterance, again at
different linguistic levels (see also Pickering and Garrod, 2014).
This proposal means that predicting another person’s utterance
involves the same predictive mechanism used to predict one’s
own utterance.
Pickering and Garrod (2013a) explained dialog as a form
of joint action in which both interlocutors predict both their
own and their partner’s utterances. The addressee can predict
the speaker’s unfolding utterance and how he might respond
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to that utterance. The speaker similarly can predict how she
will continue and how her partner might respond. Well-aligned
interlocutors (Pickering and Garrod, 2004) tend to make the
same predictions as each other. Moreover, Pickering and Garrod
(2014) proposed that interlocutors monitor the quality of these
predictions and use the discrepancies between predicted and
actual utterances (by themselves and their partners) to control
the flow of the dialog.
We propose that interlocutors make two different
types of prediction during comprehension, relating to
content and timing. The basis for content prediction is the
processes of language comprehension typically investigated in
psycholinguistics, and involves the extraction of phonology,
syntax, and particularly semantics that can be derived from
the speaker’s utterance. From these representations, the
comprehender can predict the phonology, syntax, and semantics
of the upcoming utterance. The basis for timing prediction is the
speaker’s speech rate, which the comprehender can use to predict
the rate of the upcoming utterance. We propose that these
mechanisms are distinct, but that they can influence each other
and be combined for various purposes. We now demonstrate
how they can be used to predict turn-endings. At the end of
the paper, we illustrate how they can be combined for other
purposes, for example to resolve ambiguities (e.g., Dilley and
Pitt, 2010).
To return to our example, the mother uses context to
determine the boy’s putative intention before he starts to speak
and predicts that he will produce a fairly short question asking
about what is for dinner. After the boy begins to speak, she
revises her prediction by combining context with her covert
imitation of the boy’s incomplete utteranceWhat are we going to
do after . . . (a process that is in fact informed by her monitoring
the discrepancy between his incoming utterance and her prior
prediction). She therefore covertly imitates the boy’s utterance,
derives the boy’s intention in producingWhat are we going to do
after and derives her belief about his upcoming intention, which
we assume is to produce the word dinner and then stop. She then
predicts aspects of the form of dinner (e.g., main meal, noun,
/dIn@r/, rising intonation, two syllables).
Note that Pickering and Garrod (2013a) argued that forward
models are likely to be impoverished—not containing all of
the information included in the implemented representations
underlying actual speech (see several commentaries and
Pickering and Garrod, 2013b, for discussion). By repeatedly
producing utterances as a result of intentions, the speaker
learns different intention-utterance regularities. She can draw on
different regularities depending on the situation—for example,
predicting the semantic class of the upcoming word (e.g., when
predicting whether a speaker is going to suggest one of a set of
restaurants) or the initial sound (when predicting whether the
speaker is going to suggest a particular restaurant, e.g., Kalpna).
The speaker predicts different aspects of the upcoming utterance
on different occasions. Such flexibility clearly makes the forward
models more useful for aiding fluency, but it also means that
we cannot determine which aspects of an utterance will be
represented on a particular occasion. In Alario and Hamamé’s
(2013) terms, we assume that the “opt-out” is circumstantial
rather than systematic. For example, predictions may contain
“fine-grained phonetic detail,” contra Trude (2013); see Pickering
and Garrod (2013b, p. 379).
Quite separately, she determines his speech rate, which we
assume is in terms of syllables, say 170ms/syllable. Below, we
discuss evidence both that speakers compute speech rate in
terms of syllables and that they entrain on syllable rate. The
boy’s mother therefore assumes (without further computation)
that the upcoming speech rate will also be 170ms/syllable.
Let us assume that her “target” is to leave a one-syllable gap
between her son’s contribution and her own (corresponding
to what Schegloff, 2000, calls a beat). To determine point of
initiation, she therefore estimates the length in syllables of her
son’s predicted completion (2) plus the gap (1), and multiplies
them by syllable time (i.e., 3 × 170ms = 510ms). At the same
time, she constructs linguistic representations for What are we
going to do after dinner (i.e., including dinner), and uses them
to prepare an appropriate response (e.g., Play football, which
is syntactically and semantically appropriate). This preparation
involves extension of the forward model to incorporate self- as
well as other-prediction, and also involves the implementer—in
other words, actual accessing of linguistic representations such as
the lexical entries for play and football. This allows her to utter
Play football after a one-syllable interval, assuming that he does
utter dinner and takes 340ms to do so.
Comprehenders might predict their partner’s penultimate
word and final word (both in terms of timing and content).
Making these two predictions at the same time does not
lead to resource competition because they are two compatible
predictions, as they follow from the same process of covert
imitation: one is the result of production command that would be
used to predict the next word [iB (t+ 1) in the terms of Pickering
and Garrod, 2013a], and the other the result of production
command that would be used to produce the word after that
(iB (t + 2)). For example, they might predict a completion of
after (in 340ms) and dinner (in 640ms). They do not compete
for resources. We have also noted that comprehenders make
predictions about their partner’s completion and their own
response (though of course they need to “tag” whether a specific
prediction is about themselves or their partner). For example,
they might predict their partner’s final word dinner in 340ms and
their own response Play football in 510ms. If these predictions
are compatible, they will also not compete for resources. This
will be true if the comprehender is well-aligned with the speaker,
something that is likely to be the case in a simple question-answer
case such as this. Of course, if someone is trying to comprehend a
speaker while preparing an unrelated utterance (e.g., at a “cocktail
party”), the self- and other-predictions are unlikely to be aligned
and processing difficulties may ensue.
Note also that comprehenders may use forward models
to predict multiple alternatives, weighted according to their
likelihood (e.g., Wolpert and Kawato, 1998). Such multiple
predictions are particularly valuable during comprehension,
because the speaker may often produce one of many alternatives
(e.g., dinner, supper, the meal). In fact, there is some
evidence for parallel prediction in both ERP studies (DeLong
et al., 2005) and corpus-based investigations of reading time
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 5 June 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 751
Garrod and Pickering Predicting turn transitions
(Smith and Levy, 2013). Such parallel prediction does not
appear to be resource-intensive (as it is in many dual
tasks).
Importantly, the content and timing predictions are
combined, but they remain separate predictions. The
comprehender does not construct a single (indivisible)
representation of timing and content. This means that the
comprehender can change either timing or content as necessary.
For example, the boy might not stop after dinner but produce
further words, or perhaps speak slowly or disfluently. If so, the
mother would need to alter prediction of timing but not content.
Alternatively, the boy might (unexpectedly) say swimming rather
than dinner, in which case the mother would have to revise her
interpretation (based on monitoring; Pickering and Garrod,
2014) but not timing. Below we explain how the flexibility
induced by separate representations appears to be used in
practice.
In more general terms, then, we assume that the addressee is
constantly covertly imitating the speaker, and uses the process
of covert imitation to make predictions about both the timing
and the content of the speaker’s utterance. This process supports
alignment (Pickering and Garrod, 2004), so that the addressee’s
linguistic representations become more similar to those of
the speaker, as well as entrainment of timing (see below).
Sometimes the addressee predicts that the speaker is about
to finish and that it would be appropriate for the addressee
to take the floor. Alongside this, the addressee uses forward
modeling to predict the speaker’s concluding utterance and
the addressee’s own response (in a way that is aided by the
alignment that has taken place). After the speaker finishes, and
assuming that the addressee’s prediction is correct or sufficiently
close, the addressee speaks appropriately and at the appropriate
time. We now discuss how entrainment of timing can take
place, before turning to the question of how the addressee
monitors the speaker’s utterance and how difficulties can be
managed.
How does the Addressee Entrain Timing
with the Speaker?
Arnal and Giraud (2012) argued that the brain implements
predictions about timing and content in different ways. More
specifically, predictions about the timing of sensory events
are based on cortical oscillations in the low frequency range
(delta band, 1–3Hz; theta band, 4–8Hz), whereas predictions
about sensory content are based on higher frequency cortical
oscillations (gamma band, about 30–60Hz). Both auditory and
pre-motor cortex reveal ambient neural oscillations in the
theta range (Giraud et al., 2007). Those in the auditory cortex
become entrained to theta oscillations in the speech envelope
(see Gross et al., 2013; Zion Golumbic et al., 2013). These
theta oscillations correspond to the frequency of the speaker
opening and closing her mouth and hence the rate of her
syllabic articulation (Chandrasekaran et al., 2009). According
to Arnal and Giraud, predictive timing arises from this low-
level mechanism of neural entrainment. In the presence of a
fast speaker, the auditory cortex first adapts by increasing the
rate of oscillations. These entrained oscillations then become
predictive by creating periodical temporal windows for higher-
order regions to read out encoded information (see also Kotz and
Schwartze, 2010; Giraud and Poeppel, 2012). In other words, low
frequency cortical oscillations come to predict the precise timing
of critical speech events (at the level of the beginning and end of
syllables).
There is now considerable empirical support for this with
respect to speech perception. For example, Zion Golumbic et al.
(2013) recorded ECoG (Electrocorticographic) activity in the
auditory cortex as listeners attended to one of two speakers in
a simulated “cocktail party” situation. They found that both the
phase of low frequency cortical activity (i.e., delta and theta
band) and the power of higher frequency cortical activity (high
gamma) tracked the low frequency aspects of the speech envelope
(i.e., the speech wave), for the attended but not the unattended
speech. Follow-up analyses indicated that the higher frequency
effects reflected evoked responses, whereas the low frequency
effects reflected processes more closely related to perception.
This latter finding suggests that low frequency speech tracking
serves to limit the transfer of sensory responses to higher-order
brain regions. As the low frequency phase of the attended and
unattended speech is likely to be different, the listener can use
phase tracking for selective attention.
Furthermore, they found that the precision of low frequency
tracking increased steadily from the beginning to end of each
attended utterance, consistent with a predictive process. Using
a somewhat different approach, Gross et al. (2013) compared
oscillatory MEG (Magnoencephalographic) signals in the cortex
with those in the speech envelope for a 7-min narrative played
both forwards and backwards. Mutual Information analyses
revealed that low frequency (i.e., delta, theta band) cortical
oscillations (in the right hemisphere auditory cortex) encoded
the phase of low frequency oscillations in the speech envelope,
whereas higher frequency (i.e., gamma) cortical oscillations (in
the left hemisphere auditory cortex) encoded the energy of
higher frequency oscillations in the speech envelope. Notably,
the degree of oscillatory entrainment was much greater for the
forward as opposed to the backward speech. Further, analyses of
the forward speech established that transients (i.e., high energy
bursts of sound) at the beginning of utterances reset the phase
of low frequency cortical oscillations to bring it into line with
the phase of low frequency oscillations in the speech envelope.
Such resetting of the transients did not occur to the same extent
for backward speech. This suggests that these effects reflected
top-down predictive processing as opposed to bottom-up evoked
responses.
These and related findings (see Ding and Simon, 2014) clearly
implicate a low frequency oscillatory tracking system which
represents current speech rate and predicts how it will unfold in
the immediate future. Although the functional explanation for
this entrainment process has been primarily related to syllabic
parsing (Ghitza, 2011, 2013) or selective attention (Ding and
Simon, 2012; Zion Golumbic et al., 2013), we propose that it may
also play an important role in predicting when an interlocutor’s
turn will end and timing the addressee’s response onset.
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We hypothesize that cortical theta oscillations entrained
during speech comprehension also influence the rate of speech
production, probably mediated by mid-brain circuitry (see
Giraud et al., 2007; Kotz and Schwartze, 2010). In other words,
theta oscillations in auditory cortex entrain theta oscillations in
premotor cortex, which in turn influence both the timing of the
speech onset and rate of articulation. We assume that the rate
and phase of oscillation play a causal role in such entrainment
(though it is conceivable that entrainment results from some
underlying pattern of neural activity that is highly correlated with
oscillation). This is pertinent because (as we have noted), turn-
transition involves more than detecting when an interlocutor’s
turn will end; it also involves initiating one’s own turn in a timely
fashion, with such inter-turn intervals reflecting the current
speech rate. The finding that, during dialog, interlocutors’ speech
rates and turn transition times become entrained (Street, 1984)
is consistent with coupling between the current speaker’s rate
and the subsequent speech rate of their partner (cf. Jungers and
Hupp, 2009, for priming of speech rate in monolog). It is also
consistent with Wilson and Wilson’s (2005) proposal that the
timing of turn-transitions is based on an underlying entrainment
of syllabic speech-rate oscillations. Our proposal, therefore, is
that interlocutors entrain theta oscillations in auditory cortex
and premotor cortex, and that such entrainment underlies the
coordination of comprehension and production in turn-taking.
In conclusion, interlocutors entrain their speech rates based
on low-frequency acoustic information. This process appears
to be quite separate from the mechanisms of prediction-
by-simulation and alignment, which are based on linguistic
representations. However, the addressee can combine the results
of entrainment (i.e., prediction of timing) with those of
linguistic prediction (i.e., prediction of content) to determine the
appropriate timing for turn transitions, as we illustrated in the
previous section (see Figure 1).
FIGURE 1 | A schematic illustration of the turn ending prediction
mechanism, with A as addressee (below black line) and B as
current speaker (above black line). Above the line, B’s unfolding
utterance content is shown as p [sem, syn, phon]B (t) and
p [sem, syn, phon]B (t+ 1), which refer to semantic, syntactic, and
phonological representations of the current utterance (at time t) and the
upcoming utterance (at time t+ 1, with the underlining indicating that
they are B’s representations; see Pickering and Garrod, 2013a). The
timing of B’s speech is represented in terms of the entrained theta
oscillations in B’s speech envelope. Below the line, A’s prediction of the
content of B’s unfolding utterance is shown as
cˆ [sem, syn, phon]B (t+ 1) and A’s prediction of B’s speech timing is
shown in terms of theta oscillations in A’s auditory cortex. The predicted
content comes from A covertly imitating B’s utterance at time t, deriving
B’s putative production command at time t+1 and then feeding this
production command into forward models to generate the predictions
for time t+1. The predicted timing comes from entrainment of B’s
cortical theta oscillations with theta oscillations in A’s speech envelope.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 7 June 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 751
Garrod and Pickering Predicting turn transitions
But because the mechanisms of prediction of timing and
content are shared with production, we propose that they also
aid the addressee’s own utterance production. The form of the
question (e.g., What are we going to do after dinner?) requires
a type of answer (verb phrase specifying an activity), which the
addressee can prepare by using the samemechanisms that he uses
in comprehension. The addressee’s onset and rate of articulation
follow from the entrainment of speech rate, and specifically the
suggestion that such entrainment may also occur in pre-motor
cortex (Giraud et al., 2007). This entrainment could therefore be
directly applied to the onset and timing of syllable production
in relation to the addressee’s response, on the assumption that
ambient theta oscillations in pre-motor cortex influence the
timing of speech articulation.
Preparing an Appropriate Response
So far we have concentrated on prediction of content and timing
of a partner’s current contribution and how this enables the
addressee to estimate when the turn will end. But addressees do
not merely have to predict content and turn endings; they also
have to prepare an appropriate response, or decide not to do
so. Recent research has begun to consider the extent to which
a responder’s planning overlaps with the previous utterance.
These studies make use of dual-tasking paradigms (e.g., target
tracking or finger tapping) to demonstrate more disruption
during production than comprehension (Boiteau et al., 2014;
Sjerps and Meyer, 2015). Importantly, the main indication of
difficulty during comprehension occurs in about the last half
second of the previous utterance, suggesting that planning occurs
quite late but is time-locked to turn-ending.
To respond appropriately, the new speaker has to determine
the speaker’s speech act. For example, a non-rhetorical question
mandates a (relevant) answer (or some other valid response
such as a query), whereas a rhetorical question does not.
Because utterance planning takes time (as we have argued),
fluid conversation requires that the addressee should (in general)
determine the speech act before the utterance is complete.
On occasion, it may not be possible to determine the speech
act before the end of the utterance (e.g., because the only
relevant information is rising intonation, indicating a question).
However, such cases are almost certainly quite rare (Levinson,
2012). For example, the widespread occurrence of Wh-words
or subject-verb inversion (e.g., Is the . . . ) as the beginning of
a question provides the addressee with a clear early indication
of the speech act. In addition, dialog is full of “pre-sequences”
(Schegloff, 1988) that make the upcoming speech act clear
well in advance (e.g., Can I ask you a question?). Of course,
responses are generally congruent with the prior utterance. This
is obviously the case for semantics, but is also often true for
syntax, as in question-answer pairs (e.g., Levelt and Kelter, 1982)
or cross-speaker completions (e.g., Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs,
1986). We propose that comprehenders can make use of this
congruency when planning their responses, and use it to share
resources between comprehension and preparing production, in
accord with Pickering and Garrod (2013a) and in particular the
prediction-by-simulation route.
How Addressees Take the Floor
We have argued that addressees primarily use prediction-by-
simulation to predict the content of the speaker’s utterance and
use prediction-by-simulation in combination with oscillatory
entrainment to predict its timing. Prediction of content is
enhanced by alignment at many linguistic levels and also
facilitates the formulation of an appropriate response. Prediction
of timing is used to determine when the speaker will end, and
more importantly, when the addressee should start speaking. We
now illustrate our account with examples of speaker-addressee
turn transition, some of which include difficulties. As the
examples show, turn-transition can be entirely straightforward,
but very often it leads to minor disruption that can be internally
managed (i.e., by the interlocutors themselves); our focus is on
spontaneous conversation. Rather more occasionally, it leads to
some form of conversational breakdown.
First consider an excerpt from (1) above. Bee describes
purchasing an expensive art book and then produces you know
(highlighted). While hearing this, Ava predicts that Bee is likely
to end at this point and that Ava can (or should) take the
floor (i.e., this constitutes a potential turn-transition point). The
timing of the response is the result of entrainment based on
Bee’s speech rate. Ava’s response not drop it reuses part of Bee’s
previous utterance, as expressed in the words drop and it and
the way they are combined; this repetition occurs because Ava
has linguistically aligned with Bee. Interestingly, Bee speaks at
the same time as Ava, and produces a semantically equivalent
utterance (hold onto it). This shows that both Ava’s utterance
and her timing were appropriate and that her prediction was
successful.
1 (excerpt).
Bee: Yeuh he-ez he wz handing me the book en ’etol’ me
twunny dolliz I almos’ dro(h)pped i(h)[t ‘hh ‘hh
Ava: [thhunh.
Bee: ‘hhh I said but fer twunny dollars I bettuh hh ‘hh
yihknow,
(0.2)
Bee: ‘hhh h[hold o:nto it (h)hh] huhh huh] ‘hh!
Ava: [not drop it. ] huhh huh]
P(0.2)
Bee: Ih wz, (0.2) y’know (fun)....
However, Bee’s response also creates a problem, because it means
that Bee wishes to continue speaking. Ava and Bee’s overlap
is quite extensive, presumably because they are semantically
well aligned (and may therefore find it possible to comprehend
and produce three-word overlaps). But they then both produce
laughter and stop speaking, before Bee continues. In terms of
Pickering and Garrod (2014), after you know, Ava predicts that
she will say not drop it after (say) 300ms (corresponding to the
silence plus laughter). This self-prediction turns out to be correct.
Although she may realize what Bee would have said at this point,
she presumably does not predict that Bee will also speak at this
time, as overlapping speech is strongly disfavored. When Bee
does speak, Ava compares her prediction that Bee will not speak
with the actual event. This leads to a conflict that could result
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in her stopping speaking, but in fact she judges that uttering the
three words will not be problematic. Similarly, Bee presumably
does not predict that Ava will speak at that point, but also
judges that continuation would not be problematic. However, the
overlap between Ava and Bee can be seen analogous to a speech
error (i.e., internal to one speaker) and the laughter, pause, and
Bee’s eventual continuation can be seen as a form of repair [see
points (a) and (g) in discussion of Sacks et al., 1974].
In other cases, the transitions are not quite so successful and
require some management. In Example 2 (from Schegloff, 1996,
p. 85), Ava begins by describing her unexpected activity3.
2.
Ava: I’m so:: ti:yid. I j’s played ba:ske’ball t’day since the
 rs’ time since I wz a freshm’n in hi:ghsch[ool.]
Bee: [Ba:]sk(h)=
=etb(h)a(h)ll? (h)[ ( •owhe(h)re
Ava: [Yeah fuh like an hour enna ha:[lf. ]
Bee: [.hh]
Bee: Where didju play ba:sk[etbaw. ]
Ava: [(The) gy:m].
Bee: In the gy:m?
Bee appears to predict that Ava is in the middle of uttering
high school and about to finish speaking (or at least, reach
a turn-transition point). Bee therefore queries Basketball?,
indicating surprise. Ava appears to interpret Bee’s contribution
as providing an invitation for Ava to expand, but in fact Bee
intends to continue with a more specific question (beginning
where). So both Ava and Bee predict their own utterance and
its timing, but also predict that their partner is not about
to speak. When their partner does speak, a clash ensues—
with Ava continuing but Bee ceding the floor. However, we
propose that Bee retained her question (i.e., her planned
utterance) until she was able to predict a turn-transition point
(toward the end of half ) and then produced it. Ava, in turn,
predicted that Bee was uttering basketball after the first syllable
and produced an appropriate response (the gym) as Ava was
finishing her question. We propose that dealing with these
transitions requires speakers to make separate predictions of
both content and timing, in accord with our account. (Note
that the overlap is twice associated with minor disruption to the
first speaker’s turn ending, both in high school and basketball;
see Schegloff, 2000).
So far, our examples have been from dyadic interactions. In
multi-party conversations, different addressees may be permitted
to speak at a turn-transition point. This situation can often lead to
short periods of overlapping speech (where there is “competition
for the floor”). In (3), Kathy is describing hand-weaving at a
dinner party (from Schegloff, 2000, p. 31). After pausing and
3A more literal rendition of this exchange is:
Ava: I’m so tired. I just played basketball today. The first time since I was a
freshman in high school –
Bee: Basketball – where?
Ava: Yes, for like an hour and a half-
Bee: Where did you play basketball?
Ava: The gym
Bee: In the gym?
saying you know, both Dave and Rubin speak at the same time.
Dave withdraws, and Rubin completes a question to Kathy,
who responds to him. We propose that both Dave and Rubin
predict that Kathy is about to complete her utterance you know
and that a response is appropriate. They both predict timing
correctly, so that they start immediately after Kathy finishes
and therefore at the same time as each other. But neither
predicts that the other is about to speak. Hence, there is a large
discrepancy between their predictions andwhat actually happens.
(Of course, it is possible that Dave predicts that Rubin would
speak but decided to speak anyway, in which case Dave would
not encounter such a large discrepancy during monitoring).
Dave’s approach to this discrepancy is to abandon speech,
thus preventing the communicative failure that would likely
occur following extended overlap, whereas Rubin’s approach
is to carry on regardless (perhaps assuming that Dave will
give up)4.
3.
Kathy: So once I’d set up the warp, i’ w’s very simple to
jus’ keep-jus’ to weave it.
(0.8)
Kathy: You know[ ( )
Dave: [ ( But listen tuh how long ) ]
Rubin: [In other words, you gotta string up thee]
you gotta string up thee colors, is that it
Kathy: [ Right ]
Rubin: [in thee ] in thee [warp.]
Kathy: [right ]
Finally, we note that the addressee can separate the process
of prediction from the process of preparing a response. The
response can be “ready” before it is executed (just as in Ferreira,
1991; Piai et al., 2011). In (4) (from Schegloff, 2000, p. 25), a
family is querying Anne’s claim that she used to buy a pair of
shoes a month before she was married, and her husband Dick
keeps attempting to make a joke about it:5
4A more literal rendition of this exchange is:
Kathy: So once I have set up the warp, it was very simple to just keep – just weave
it. You know.
Dave: But listen to how long –
Rubin: In other words, you have got to string up the – you have got to string up
three colors, is that it.
Kathy: Right.
Rubin: In the – in the warp.
Kathy: Right
5A more literal rendition of this exchange is:
Anne: Every six months I went in for shoes. and I had– must have had about, a
hundred pairs a shoes.
Deb: Really mother you spent–
Dick: You know what -
Deb: Boy were you wasted
Dick: you know she exaggerated slightly.
Dick: You know what– you know–
Deb: What a waster you were
Anne: Don’t say that I’m exa– just say I’m a liar.
Dick: You know what your –
Deb: It’s not a question of lying it’s a question of being–
Dick: Your grandmother is a centipede that’s why she has to have a hundred pairs of
shoes.
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4.
Anne: Every six months I wen’ in  h shoes. ’n I had-
must’v had about, (0.5) a hundred pairs a shoes.
(2.0)
Deb: Really mother = you spent-
(1.0)
Dick: You know [wha : t,]
Deb: [Boy we ]re you:: w- [ w a s t e d ]
Dick: [(you know) sh-]
Exaggerated slightly.
(0.8)
Dick: Y’ [know what-y’know- [ ( ) ]
Deb: [w h a t a w a s [ter you ] w e r e ]
Anne: [DON’T S]AYthat I’m ex]=
=a- just say I’m a liar.
Dick: Y’know what, yer [ grandmother - ] =
Deb: [>’ts nota question<] of =
=[<ly:ing ’t’s a question of being- >]
Dick: =[yer GRANDMOTHER IS A CENTI]PE:DE,
that’s why- she esstuh hev a khundred pairs of
shoes.
At (24), (29), and (33) (in bold), Dick tries and fails to utter the
joke (i.e., Anne is a centipede) that he eventually manages at (36).
Dick uses prediction of timing and content to determine a turn-
transition point on all four occasions. However, Deb manages
to capture the floor three times. On each occasion, Dick has
a prepared utterance, which is presumably ready throughout
the interchange (from [24] onwards, at least), and hence the
preparation of the utterance is separate from the predicted
timing. This is a further indication of the distinction between
mechanisms for timing and content.
Implications and Discussion
We have shown how content can be combined with timing to
predict the end of the interlocutor’s turn and determine the
appropriate moment to speak. But content and timing can also
be used to determine content itself. A good example comes from
Dilley and Pitt (2010), who presented listeners with a context
spoken at different rates preceding the phrase leisure or time and
found that they tended to hear it as leisure time (i.e., without or)
if the context was spoken slowly. They then presented listeners
with a context preceding the phrase leisure time and found that
they tended to hear the phrase as leisure or time if the context
was spoken quickly. Presumably, participants are entrained to
the contextual speech rate and then predict that the upcoming
phrase will also be produced at that rate. Their interpretation of
the phrase is therefore dependent on their predictions. In terms of
Figure 1, the predicted timing is used to help determine utterance
content.
In this paper, we have focused on the role of prediction
during comprehension on turn transition. Specifically, we have
argued that comprehenders predict the speaker’s content and
speech rate, and use these to compute what they are likely
to say and how quickly they are likely to say it. We also
assume that such prediction helps the comprehender decide
when to speak and what to say. However, Pickering and Garrod
(2013a) also proposed that prediction during comprehension aids
comprehension itself (e.g., facilitating word recognition in noise),
aids learning (as comprehenders learn from the discrepancy
between the prediction and the actual speech), permits other
monitoring (e.g., detecting speaker’s errors; Pickering and
Garrod, 2014), and assists in the process of alignment (Pickering
and Garrod, 2004). Finally, we note that our account is consistent
with the effects of timing disruption in dialog. It has been known
for 50 years that delaying transmission can seriously disrupt
conversation (e.g., Krauss and Bricker, 1967).
A specific set of empirical predictions following from this
account concern the separation of timing and content. In a
turn-taking paradigm (e.g., question-answering), there should
be separate effects of content difficulty (e.g., hard vs. easy
questions) and regularity of timing (e.g., varying regularity
of speech rate). But in addition, we propose that turn-taking
relates to a combination of timing and predicted length in
syllables. If a speaker expects a long sentence-final word but
gets a short one (e.g., Is the largest animal in zoo the bear?,
when elephant is expected), then the turn interval should be
larger than if the expected word was short (Is the fiercest
animal in the zoo the bear, when lion is expected), but this
interval should also be affected by speech rate. Experiments
such as these should be able to show how predictions of
timing and content are separable but ultimately combined in
turn-taking.
In conclusion, we have presented a cognitive account to
explain the skill with which conversationalists manage turn-
transitions in dialog. The account covers addressees’ ability
to predict when their interlocutor’s turn will end, to craft an
appropriate response, and to implement the response in a
timely fashion. To do this, we propose that they make use
of prediction-by-simulation to predict upcoming content and
oscillatory entrainment to predict timing. Whereas predicted
content depends on forward modeling mechanisms similar to
those used in control of speech production, predicted timing
results from sensitivity to characteristics of the speech envelope.
However, the addressee brings these predictions together in a
way that leads to well-coordinated dialog, with very brief turn
transitions. In this way, we propose that interlocutors are able
to make an apparently difficult aspect of conversation appear
remarkably straightforward.
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